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The Next War / The Iraq conflict was a preview, but not the whole
script, of battles to come
John Arquilla
Published 4:00 am, Sunday, May 4, 2003
The adage that generals always fight the last war is only partially true. They also fight some of the next war each time they go
into action.
Wars are time portals, waged in the present but reflecting both the staying power of older ideas and the allure of unproven
new concepts.
In World War I, for example, the centuries-old tradition of massed infantry assaults was still adhered to -- with appalling casualties
the result. On the first day of the Somme offensive alone, the British lost 20,000 men to German artillery and machine guns -- and
gained only a few yards of ground.
This same war also saw the debut of the tank at Cambrai, where it enabled the capture of a huge swath of ground in a few hours --
with almost no casualties -- and heralded the rise of armor to its long-dominant role in military affairs.
Thus wars carry both the past and the future within them. The art of generalship lies in knowing when to jettison the old in favor of
the new. This has proved true again in our second war with Iraq, but some of this conflict's implications for the next war may prove
quite uncomfortable for the Pentagon.
The biggest casualty of the war in Iraq should be the much-hyped notion of shock and awe -- a warmed-over variant of the belief that
strategic aerial bombing can bring any adversary quickly to heel.
Every major conflict beginning with World War II has featured the bombing of cities and civil infrastructure, with noncombatants
often deliberately targeted. Enormous destruction has been done, yet it is hard to see any air campaign as having worked by itself.
During the Korean War, U.S. bombers flattened every building in Pyongyang, yet we could manage only a draw. The Air Force
dropped more bombs on North Vietnam than in any other campaign, yet we lost that war. Bombing may have worked in Kosovo, but
the Serb retreat there could just as likely have resulted from President Bill Clinton's decision, after 77 days, to consider a
ground invasion.
In this latest war, we dropped seven times the amount of explosives that fell in 1991 -- with little effect on Iraqi will. Only a successful
ground invasion brought down the regime.
Despite knowing the limitations of air bombardment, triumphalists in and out of uniform tried to sell this war to the American public
and to the world on the basis of the patently false claim that big explosions would prompt surrender in a day or so.
Instead, the steady pattern of past strategic bombing failures was borne out again, the lesson for the next war being to stay away from
such delusions. Bombing doesn't win by itself, and the killing of innocent noncombatants in such attacks undermines the justice of
any cause.
San Francisco 73° Sign In RegisterSearch
News Sports Business A&E Food Living Travel Columns Cars Jobs Real Estate
Find&Save
5/12/14, 2:50 PMThe Next War / The Iraq conflict was a preview, but not the whole script, of battles to come - SFGate
Page 2 of 4http://www.sfgate.com/opinion/article/The-Next-War-The-Iraq-conflict-was-a-preview-2618744.php
The second cautionary lesson of the war in Iraq was highlighted by the multidivisional march up Mesopotamia -- another blast from
the past. Tanks and humvees made a beeline for Baghdad and had to rely on vulnerable supply lines that stretched for hundreds
of miles.
The Iraqis correctly avoided our combat teeth and went after our long logistical tail -- causing us some real problems for a while. In
the end, we were able to cope with their small-unit attacks, but the lesson for the next war should be to avoid creating such soft, juicy
targets. Our next opponents may prove better armed or more skillful than the Iraqis. Or both.
It is high time, then, in the military evolutionary process, to lose our tails.
So much for residual elements of past conflicts that should disappear. The campaign in Iraq also gave us some tantalizing glimpses of
the next war. The most important aspect of the future of conflict on display was the way in which small forces were empowered
by networking.
That is, by being connected to each other in ways that allowed our forces to identify, target and strike the enemy within minutes of
detection. In the last Gulf war, this process generally took several hours.
SMALLER IS BETTER
In this latest campaign, Anglo-American forces undertook a mission several times bigger than in the last Gulf war -- with less than
half the force. The only way this could be done was by packetizing our forces in small task groups,
then linking them to each other and to aircraft overhead in mutually supporting ways.
Indeed, aircraft found their proper use in close support of ground troops, allowing the allies to fight with less than one-tenth of the
artillery that was used 12 years ago. This accounts for the speedy advance to Baghdad because it is hard to move artillery along swiftly.
The tremendous hitting power of small but highly networked combat formations also made it possible to strike at the enemy from
many directions simultaneously -- i.e., to use swarm tactics. Thus the campaign featured the quick disabling of the Iraqi Scud missile
fields in the west, the saving of the oil fields in the south, and the launching of a Kurdish attack in the north, led by our special forces.
These aspects of the campaign came off far better than the bombing of Baghdad or the march up Mesopotamia. There was a shift this
time from Desert Storm to Desert Swarm.
It seems clear what we should discard and what we should keep when thinking about the next war. But the opposition to meaningful
change in the American military is on guard and well entrenched.
The first warning shot fired at military traditionalists came earlier, in the fall 2001 Afghan campaign. This was a time war, too, as it
featured similar images from the past and glimpses of the future.
First, there was a month of unsuccessful strategic bombing of Kabul, Kandahar and other fixed targets. At that point, Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld compelled senior military officials to unleash small teams of special forces highly networked with aircraft
and unmanned aerial vehicles. In a few weeks, just over 300 special forces operators -- for the most part riding on horses -- toppled
the Taliban and al Qaeda from power.
DEBATE OVER STRATEGY
Between the Afghan and Iraq conflicts, a sharp policy debate erupted, characterized by innovators' calls for radical downsizing of field
armies and creating a fully networked military. Traditionalists held that Afghanistan was an exceptional case at best, with some, like
Stephen Biddle of the U.S. Army War College, writing official studies that saw little new in the campaign.
To them it was just a clash between two ground forces, in which air support proved decisive. Rumsfeld's sympathies were clearly with
the innovators, but he had to manage and maintain an equilibrium between both camps.
He did so by compromising on the campaign in Iraq, where the innovators wanted to send no more than 75,000 troops and the
traditionalists wanted 500, 000. He split the difference, coming in with an expeditionary force of about 300,000.
When the first hitches in the campaign arose -- the spectacular failure of shock and awe and the Fedayeen attacks on our supply lines
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-- traditionalists renewed their calls for larger forces. Whether observing events from inside the Pentagon or from television studios,
traditionalists were unwilling or unable to see that the only problems with the campaign had arisen from the inclusion of the very
elements that they had insisted upon or supported in prewar planning.
All soon came out right, though, leaving us military analysts with the need to think through what the next war ought to look like. At
present, the most likely place where a new conflict might erupt is Korea, as the communist regime in the north determinedly seeks to
expand its arsenal of weapons of mass destruction. It also has a million-man army, about 10 percent of which is comprised of
special forces.
The North Korean military is in far better shape than the Iraqis, and the terrain on which it would fight is far tougher than the flat,
open desert of the Tigris valley. How then should insights from our most recent conflict inform contingency plans for this possible
next war?
Military traditionalists will view Iraq as another exceptional case and seek ways to emphasize the need for more troops on the ground
in Korea and for more strategic bombing capability.
STRATEGY FOR KOREA
Innovators (of whom I am one) will argue that the campaign in Iraq should lead us to discard large forces and strategic bombing and
replace them with a distributed network of small ground units that can call in close fire support from missiles and aircraft. Also, this
approach would work whether we were on the defensive from the outset or if we engaged in hot pre-emption.
A smaller, networked approach to this possible next war would complement South Korean forces and would mitigate our serious
vulnerability to North Korean attacks with bugs, poison or nuclear weaponry. We wouldn't provide any juicy targets for such
weapons. Further, the rough terrain on the Korean peninsula would channelize any attack from the north, allowing us to swarm the
invaders from all directions.
However, we should be concerned that the North Koreans will have been watching events in Iraq closely and that they are preparing
their own surprises for us if war breaks out. They will likely deploy their special forces in swarming attacks on our supply lines, flying
them in on canvas- covered, radar-evading AN-2 Colt biplanes that can carry a dozen soldiers each.
They might also think about detonating a nuclear weapon at high altitude, generating an electromagnetic pulse that could cripple
our communications.
But these are solvable problems. If we stay away from using heavy forces, their commandos will have no supply lines to hit.
Communications can be hardened against pulses, and replacements and redundancies can be used to mitigate this risk.
The question about fighting a war is always about finding the proper mix of old and new. Right now, the U.S. military is at a tipping
point. Our second Gulf War was roughly a half-and-half affair, with old and new ways of fighting employed in equal doses.
This is hardly likely to remain the case. The implications of the war in Iraq clearly point to moving away from strategic bombing and
big, heavy force packages.
However, these are the two most cherished items in the U.S. defense establishment. They have long been quintessential elements of
what historian Russell Weigley calls the American way of war.
They also cost a great deal, doing much to justify our current rate of defense spending, which is more than $1 billion per day. Small,
networked forces pose the prospect of fighting more effectively at much lower cost -- a dire threat to the current system, which will
be resisted.
What is to be done?
Very simply, the debate between the traditionalists and the innovators must be fully and publicly aired, and presidential candidates
next year must be urged to be explicit about their positions on this aspect of defense policy. In the meantime, consider this the
opening salvo in the fight over the next war.
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